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Geopolitics, the dictionary tells us, is about international great-power rivalries –the struggle for dominance among
territorially defined states. Conflict is at the heart of geopolitics. Geopolitical relations are dynamic, strategic, and
hierarchical. In geopolitics, the meek definitely do not inherit the earth.
Today, much the same can be said about currencies, which in recent years have become increasingly competitive on
a  global  scale.  Monetary  relations,  too,  have  become conflictual  and hierarchical;  and the  meek  are  similarly
disadvantaged.  At  issue  is  a  breakdown  of  the  neat  territorial  monopolies  that  national  governments  have
historically claimed in the management of money, a market-driven process that elsewhere I have described as the
deterritorialization of money (Cohen 1998, 2003a). In lieu of monopoly, what we have now is more like oligopoly –a
finite number of autonomous suppliers, national governments, all vying ceaselessly to shape and manage demand
for their respective currencies. Since most states are no longer able to exercise supreme control over the circulation
and use of money within their own frontiers, they must instead do what they can to preserve or promote market
share.  As  a  result,  the  population  of  the  monetary  universe  is  becoming ever  more  stratified,  assuming the
appearance of a vast Currency Pyramid –narrow at the top, where the strongest monies dominate; and increasingly
broad below, reflecting varying degrees of competitive inferiority.
What are the geopolitical implications of this new geography of money? At present, one currency stands head and
shoulders above the rest –the US dollar, familiarly known as the greenback. The dollar  is the only truly global
currency, used for all  the familiar purposes of money –medium of exchange, unit of account, store of value– in
virtually every corner of the world. From its dominant market share, the United States gains significant economic
and political advantages. The question is: can the dominance of the dollar be challenged? The answer comes in two
parts: first, if we look at the logic of market competition; and, secondly, if we factor in government preferences as
well.
Looking at the logic of market competition alone, the answer is clear. The dollar will continue to prevail. Presently,
only two other currencies are used at all widely outside their countries of issue. These are the euro, the new joint
money of the European Union (EU) and the Japanese yen. Together, these are the Big Three of currency geopolitics.
But neither the euro nor the yen, I submit, poses a serious competitive threat to the greenback in today’s global
marketplace.
Once  we  factor  in  government  preferences,  however,  the  outlook  becomes  cloudier.  That  the  Europeans  and
Japanese will do all they can to sustain the market appeal of their currencies may be taken for granted. But whether
they will go further, to seek formation of organized monetary blocs with foreign governments, is less certain. Japan
may well to seek to challenge the dollar’s present dominance in East Asia; likewise, Europe could be tempted to
make a battleground of the Middle East. Neither, however, is likely to carry currency confrontation with the United
States to the point where it might jeopardize more vital political and security interests. Mutual restraint among the
Big Three would appear to be the safest bet.
I. The Dollar
I begin with the dollar. Broadly speaking, currencies may be employed outside their country of origin for either of
two purposes: for transactions either between nations or within foreign states. The former is conventionally referred
to  as  international  currency  use  or  currency  internationalization;  the  latter  goes  under  the  label  currency
substitution  and can  be  referred  to  as  foreign-domestic  use.  For  both  purposes America’s  greenback  today  is
indisputably the market leader, the Top Currency perched at the peak of the Currency Pyramid. Its only possible
rivals are the euro and, more distantly, the yen. Because of the dollar’s market leadership, it may be argued, the
United States is privileged both economically and politically.
The dollar’s market leadership
The clearest signal of the dollar’s leadership in international currency use is sent by the global foreign-exchange
market where, according to the Bank for International Settlements (2002), the dollar is the most favoured vehicle
for currency trading worldwide, appearing on one side or the other of some 90% of all transactions in 2001 (the
latest  year  for  which  such  data  are  available).  The  euro,  in  distant  second place,  appeared  in  just  38%  of
transactions –higher than the share of its popular predecessor, the deutsche mark (DM), which had appeared in 30%
of transactions in 1998, but lower than that of all the euro’s constituent currencies taken together that same year
(53%). The yen was even further behind with only 23% (1).
The greenback is also the most favoured vehicle for the invoicing of international trade, where it has been estimated
to account for nearly half of all world exports (Hartmann 1998), more than double America’s share of global trade.
The DM’s share of invoicing in its last years, prior to its replacement by the euro, was 15%, roughly equivalent to
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Germany’s proportion of world exports. Preliminary evidence from the European Central  Bank, the ECB (2002:
39-42), suggests that the euro’s share may have increased modestly since its introduction as a ‘virtual’ currency in
1999, albeit mainly for Europe’s own trade with the outside world rather than in exchanges between third countries.
The yen’s share of global invoicing was just 5%, significantly less than Japan’s proportion of world exports.
A parallel story is evident too in international markets for financial claims, including bank deposits and loans as well
as bonds and stocks. Using data from a variety of sources, Thygesen et al. (1995) calculated what they call ‘global
financial  wealth’, the world’s total  portfolio of private international  investments, estimated at more than US$4.5
trillion in 1993. Again the dollar dominated, accounting for close to two-fifths of international bonds and nearly
three-fifths of foreign-currency deposits. The DM accounted for 10% of bonds and 14% of deposits; the yen for 14%
of bonds and 4% of deposits. More recently, the euro has cut into the greenback’s share of the bond market,
accounting now for close to 30% of all issues as against 44% for the dollar and just 13% for the yen (ECB 2002:
17-19). But in international banking the dollar still dominates, with a share of 55% of deposits compared with 24%
for the euro and 7% for the yen (ECB 2002: 16).
The  clearest  signal  of  the  greenback’s  leadership in  foreign-domestic  use  is  sent  by  the  swift  increase  in  the
currency’s  physical  circulation  outside  the  borders  of  the  United  States,  mostly  in  the  form of  US$100  bills.
Authoritative studies by the Federal Reserve (Porter and Judson 1996) and the US Treasury (2000) put the value of
all Federal Reserve notes in circulation abroad at between 50% and 70% of the total outstanding stock –equivalent
at the turn of the century to roughly US$275 billion to US$375 billion in all (2).  Estimates also suggest that as
much as three-quarters of the annual increase of US notes now goes directly abroad, up from less than one-half in
the 1980s and under one-third in the 1970s. By the end of the 1990s, as much as 90% of all US$100 notes issued
by the Federal Reserve were going directly abroad to satisfy foreign demand (Lambert and Stanton 2001). Appetite
for the greenback appears to be not only strong but growing.
By contrast, estimates by Germany’s central bank, the Bundesbank (1995), put foreign circulation of the DM in its
last years, mainly in East-Central Europe and the Balkans, at no more than 30% to 40% of total stock, equivalent at
year-end 1994 to some DM65-90 billion (US$45-65 billion) (3).  It remains unclear to what extent euro notes may
surpass the level of popularity previously enjoyed by the DM (ECB 2002: 48-52). On the other side of the world,
Bank of Japan officials have been privately reported to believe that of the total supply of yen bank notes, amounting
to some US$370 billion in 1993, no more than 10% was located in neighbouring countries (Hale 1995) (4).
Advantages for the United States
Not surprisingly, all this international and foreign-domestic use of the dollar appears to translate into considerable
advantages for  the United States, both economic and political. Though minimized by some (eg, Wyplosz  1999:
97-100), the benefits of market leadership in currency affairs can in fact be quite substantial. Four distinct gains
may be cited.
Most familiar is the potential for seigniorage. Expanded cross-border circulation of a country’s money generates the
equivalent of a subsidized or interest-free loan from abroad –an implicit transfer that represents a real-resource
gain  for  the economy as a whole. Consider  just the circulation  of  Federal  Reserve notes, which  are a form of
non-interest bearing liability. Updating earlier estimates by Jeffrey A. Frankel (1995) and Alan S. Blinder (1996),
current  interest  savings  from foreign  circulation  of  the  greenback  may  be  conservatively  calculated  at  some
US$16-22 billion a year. To this may be added a saving of interest payments on US government securities, which
are uniquely attractive to foreign holders because of their greater liquidity. Richard Portes and Hélène Rey (1998:
309) call this an ‘often neglected source of seigniorage to the issuer of the international currency’. In their words
(1998: 309): ‘This international currency effect reduces the real yields that the United States government has to
pay’ –a ‘liquidity discount’ that they suggest could amount to at least US$5-10 billion a year. Put these numbers
together  and,  paraphrasing  former  Republican  Senator  Everett  Dirksen’s  celebrated  remark  about  the  Federal
budget, we are beginning to talk about real money.
A second gain is the increased flexibility of macroeconomic policy that is afforded by the privilege of being able to
rely on one’s own money to help finance foreign deficits. Expanded cross-border circulation reduces the real cost of
adjustment to unanticipated payments shocks by internalizing through credit  what otherwise would be external
transactions requiring  scarce  foreign  exchange.  In  effect,  it  reduces the  need to  worry  about  the  balance  of
payments in formulating and implementing domestic policy. Who can remember the last time Washington decision
makers actively incorporated concern for our large current deficits or our exchange rate in debating the course of
monetary and fiscal policy?
Third, more psychological in nature, is the gain of status and prestige that goes with market dominance. Money, as I
have written elsewhere (Cohen 1998), has long played a key symbolic role for governments, useful  –like flags,
anthems and postage stamps– as a means to cultivate a unique sense of national identity. But that critical role is
eroded to the extent that a local currency is displaced by a more popular foreign money, especially a money like the
greenback that is so widely used on a daily basis. Foreign publics are constantly reminded of America’s elevated rank
in the community of nations. ‘Great powers have great currencies’, Nobel laureate Robert Mundell once wrote (1993:
10). In effect, the dollar has become a potent symbol of American primacy –an example of what political scientist
Joseph S. Nye (1990) has called ‘soft power’, the ability to exercise influence by shaping beliefs and perceptions.
Though obviously difficult to quantify, the role of reputation in geopolitics should not be underestimated.
Finally, there is the gain of ‘hard’ geopolitical power that derives from the monetary dependence of others. On the
one hand, an issuing country is better insulated from outside influence in the domestic arena. On the other hand, it
is also better positioned to pursue foreign objectives without constraint, or even to exercise a degree of coercion
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internationally. As political scientist Jonathan Kirshner reminds us (1995: 29, 31): ‘Monetary power is a remarkably
efficient  component of  state power... the most  potent instrument  of  economic coercion  available to states in  a
position to exercise it’. Money, after all, is simply command over real resources. If another country can be denied
access to the means needed to purchase vital goods and services, it is clearly vulnerable in political terms. Kirshner
lists four ways in which currency dependence can be exploited: (a) enforcement –manipulation of standing rules or
threats of sanctions; (b) expulsion –suspension or termination of privileges; (c) extraction –use of the relationship
to  extract  real  resources;  and  (d)  entrapment  –transformation  of  a  dependent  state’s  interests.  The  dollar’s
widespread use puts all of these possibilities in the hands of Washington policymakers.
Admittedly there are limits to these benefits, which are likely to be greatest in the early stages of cross-border use
when  confidence  in  a  money  is  highest.  Later,  as  external  liabilities  accumulate  increasing supply  relative  to
demand, gains may be eroded, particularly if an attractive alternative comes on the market. Foreign holders may
legitimately worry about the risk of future depreciation or even restrictions on the usability of their holdings. Thus
the currency leader’s autonomy may eventually be constrained, to a degree, by a need to discourage sudden or
substantial conversions through the exchange market. Both seigniorage income, on a net basis, and macroeconomic
flexibility will be reduced if a sustained increase of interest rates is required to sustain market share. Likewise, overt
exploitation of political power will  be inhibited if foreigners can switch allegiance easily to another currency. But
even  admitting  such  limits,  there  seems  little  doubt  that  on  balance  these  are  advantages  of  considerable
significance, as numerous sources acknowledge (eg, Portes and Rey 1998: 308-310).
II. The Logic of Market Competition
Can the dominance of the dollar be challenged? As indicated, the greenback’s only possible rivals at the moment are
the euro and the yen. But the logic of market competition, I contend, suggests that neither will able to match, let
alone surpass, the dollar’s popularity in the foreseeable future. Left to their own devices to choose among the Big
Three, market actors will continue to give a distinct preference to the dollar.
Barriers to displacement
Displacement of a market leader is not easy, for two reasons: first, because the qualities required for competitive
success tend to be highly demanding; and, secondly, because of inertia, which is a characteristic inherent in all
monetary behaviour.
Fundamentally, currency choice in the global  marketplace is shaped by three essential  attributes. First, at  least
during the initial  stages of  a money’s cross-border  use, is widespread confidence in  its future value backed by
political stability in the country of origin. Second are the qualities of ‘exchange convenience’ and ‘capital certainty’
–a high degree of transactional liquidity and reasonable predictability of asset value. The key to both qualities is a
set of well developed financial markets, sufficiently open to ensure full access by non-residents. Markets must not be
encumbered by high transactions costs or formal or informal barriers to entry. They must also be broad, with a large
assortment of instruments available for  temporary or  longer-term forms of investment, and resilient, with fully
operating  secondary  markets  for  most  if  not  all  financial  claims.  And third,  a  money  must  promise  a  broad
transactional network, since nothing enhances a currency’s acceptability more than the prospect of acceptability by
others. Historically, this factor has usually meant an economy that is large in absolute size and well integrated into
world markets. The greater the volume of transactions conducted in or with a country, the greater are the potential
network externalities to be derived from use of its money. Not many currencies can meet all  these demanding
conditions. Today there are only the Big Three.
Moreover, even with the requisite attributes, displacement is difficult because of inertia in currency choice. The
principle source of inertia is the pre-existence of already well established transactional networks, which generate a
well documented stickiness in user preferences –what specialists call hysteresis or ratchet effects. In effect, prior use
confers a certain natural advantage of incumbency. Switching from one money to another is costly, involving an
expensive process of financial adaptation. Considerable effort must be invested in creating and learning to use new
instruments and institutions, with much riding on what other market agents may be expected to do at the same
time. Hence as attractive as a given money may seem, adoption will not prove cost-effective unless others appear
likely to make extensive use of it too. In the words of economists Kevin Dowd and David Greenaway (1993: 1180):
‘Changing currencies is costly –we must learn to reckon in the new currency, we must change the units in which we
quote prices, we might have to change our records, and so on.... [This] explains why agents are often reluctant to
switch currencies, even when the currency they are using appears to be manifestly inferior to some other’.
Inertia is also promoted by the  exceptionally  high  level  of  uncertainty that is  inherent in  any choice between
alternative  monies.  Uncertainty  encourages  a  tendency  toward  what  psychologists  call  ‘mimesis’:  the  rational
impulse of risk-averse actors, in conditions of contingency, to minimize anxiety by imitative behaviour based on past
experience.  Once  a  currency  gains a  degree  of  acceptance,  its  use  is  apt  to  be  perpetuated  –even  after  the
appearance of powerful new competitors– simply by regular repetition of previous practice. In effect, a conservative
bias is inherent in the dynamics of the marketplace. As one source has argued (Orléan 1989: 81-83), ‘imitation
leads to the emergence of a convention [wherein] emphasis is placed on a certain “conformism” or even hermeticism
in financial circles’.
The salience of inertia in this context is well illustrated by the dollar’s own experience when it first began to rival the
pound sterling, the dominant currency of the nineteenth century. Even after America’s emergence as the world’s
richest  economy, it  took  literally  decades for  the  greenback  to ascend to top rank  among currencies.  As Paul
Krugman has commented (1992: 173): ‘The impressive fact here is surely the inertia; sterling remained the first-
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ranked currency for half a century after Britain had ceased to be the first-ranked economic power’. Similar inertias
have  been  evident  for  millennia  in  the  prolonged use  of  such  international  moneys as  the  Byzantine  solidus
(otherwise known as the bezant) or the Spanish silver peso (later known as the Mexican silver dollar) long after the
decline of the imperial powers that first coined them (Cohen 1998: ch. 2). In fact, such inertias are very much the
rule, not the exception, in global monetary relations.
Exceptional or not, even the most stubborn inertias can in time be overcome, as these historical  examples also
illustrate. But to defeat the conservative bias in market behaviour, a new contender must do more than merely
match  the  attributes of  the  market  leader.  It  must  be  able  to  offer  substantial  advantages over  the  existing
incumbent. The dollar was able to do that in relation to sterling once New York overtook London as the world’s
pre-eminent source of investment capital. The problem for  the euro and yen is that for  the foreseeable future,
neither can realistically hope to offer comparable advantages in relation to the greenback.
The yen
Consider first the yen. Little probability can be attached to a successful challenge by the vaunted Japanese currency,
despite Japan’s evident strengths as the world’s top creditor nation and its enviable long-term record of success in
controlling inflation and promoting exports. Cross-border use of the yen did accelerate significantly in the 1970s and
1980s, during the heady years of Japanese economic expansion. Internationalization was strongest in bank lending
and securities markets, where because of an appreciating exchange rate yen-denominated claims were especially
attractive to investors. But the yen never came close to overtaking the popularity of the dollar, or even the DM, and
was little used for either trade invoicing or currency substitution. Worse, its upward trajectory was abruptly halted in
the 1990s, following the bursting of Japan’s ‘bubble economy’, and there seems little prospect of resumption in the
near term so long as Japanese domestic stagnation persists.
In fact, use of the yen abroad in recent years has, in relative terms, actually decreased rather than increased. In
exchange markets, the 23% yen share of global turnover reported in 2001 represented a considerable decline from
a high of 27% in 1989; similarly, in central-bank reserves, the yen’s share of the total has shrunk from some 7% at
the end of the 1980s to under 5% a decade later. Overall, the yen’s position near the peak of the Currency Pyramid
has slipped substantially below both the other market leaders, as informed observers now readily acknowledge. In
the words of one knowledgeable group of experts (Bergsten et al. 2001: 234), ‘the yen is now a distant third among
global currencies, far behind the new euro as well as the dollar’ (5).
Largely, the yen’s decline of popularity abroad mirrors Japan’s economic troubles at home, which include not only a
fragile banking system but also a level of public debt, relative to GDP, that is now the highest of any industrial
nation. Perhaps the greatest burden for the yen is Japan’s financial system, which despite recent improvements has
long lagged behind American and even many European markets in terms of openness or efficiency. Starting in the
mid-1970s, a process of liberalization began, prompted partly by a slowing of domestic economic growth and partly
by external pressure from the United States. Most dramatic was a multi-year liberalization programme announced in
1996, dubbed the Big Bang in imitation of the swift deregulation of Britain’s financial markets a decade earlier. But
the reform process is still far from complete and could take many years to come even close to approximating market
standards in the United States or Europe, where transaction costs are considerably lower.
Without  further  progress  in  financial-market  liberalization,  the  yen  will  remain  at  a  distinct  competitive
disadvantage. International traders and investors will have little incentive to bear the costs and risks of switching
from either the dollar or the euro to the yen. Indeed, if left to market forces alone, the trend is more likely to
continue moving the other way, towards gradual erosion of the yen’s standing as an international currency in a
manner reminiscent of sterling’s long decline in an earlier era.
The euro
In principle, prospects for the euro should be much brighter. Europe’s new currency started life in January 1999 with
many of the attributes necessary for competitive success already well  in evidence. Together, the twelve present
members of the EU’s Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) –familiarly known as ‘Euroland’– constitute an economy
nearly as large as that of the United States, with extensive trade relations not only in the European region but
around the world.  The potential  for  network  externalities is considerable. Likewise, Euroland started with  both
unquestioned political  stability and an enviably low rate of inflation, backed by a joint monetary authority, the
European Central  Bank, that is fully committed to preserving confidence in  the euro’s future value. Much room
exists, therefore, for a quick ascendancy towards the peak of the Currency Pyramid, as many have predicted. Typical
is the attitude of Robert Mundell, who expresses no doubt that the euro ‘will challenge the status of the dollar and
alter the power configuration of the system’ (2000: 57). In the oft-quoted words of Jacques Delors, former head of
the European Commission, ‘le petit euro deviendra grand’.
In practice, however, the outlook for  the euro is anything but rosy. Indeed, with each passing year it becomes
increasingly clear that serious obstacles lie in the path of the euro’s ascent. Within the European region, of course,
the euro will dominate easily; and its influence may even be extended as well to some neighbouring areas, such as
the Mediterranean littoral or sub-Saharan Africa –what the ECB (2001) has called the ‘Euro-time zone’. In these
areas the euro is the natural currency of choice. As Wyplosz remarks: ‘This is the euro’s turf’ (1999: 89). But that
appears to be as far as the new money’s domain will expand as a result of market forces alone. Virtually all the
growth of cross-border use of the euro since its introduction has occurred within the Euro-time zone (ECB 2002:
54). Elsewhere, left to the logic of market competition, the currency seems fated to remain a distant second to the
greenback. In a recent analysis (Cohen 2003b), I spell out three critical reasons for this negative assessment.
Transactions costs. First is the cost of doing business in euros, which directly affects the currency’s attractiveness
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as a vehicle for foreign-exchange transactions or international trade. Euro transaction costs, as measured by bid-ask
spreads, are historically higher than those on the more widely traded dollar. Whether they can be lowered to more
competitive levels will depend directly on what happens to the structural efficiency of Europe’s financial markets. On
the face of it, prospects for euro transaction costs look good. In purely quantitative terms, introduction of the euro
promises to create the largest single-currency capital  market in the world; and that expansion, in  turn, should
trigger  major  qualitative  improvements  in  depth  and  liquidity  as  previously  segmented  national  markets  are
gradually knitted together  into an integrated whole. As a practical  matter, however, progress to date has been
disappointing, owing to stubborn resistance to many market-opening measures; and as a result it is not at all clear
that the euro’s promise in this respect can ever  be converted fully into performance. As a recent EU report on
Europe’s  financial  markets  –the  so-called  Lamfalussy  Report–  firmly  insisted  (European  Union  2001:  8):  ‘The
European Union  has no divine  right  to the  benefits of  an  integrated financial  market. It  has to capture those
benefits’ –and so far, at least, the EU has not done a very good job at doing so.
In certain key respects the dollar’s advantages will persist no matter what the EU does. Most important is the lack of
a universal financial instrument in Europe to rival the US Treasury bill for liquidity and convenience –a deficiency
that will be difficult, if not impossible, to rectify so long as the Europeans, with their separate national governments,
lack a counterpart to the Federal Government in Washington. Full consolidation of Euroland’s markets for public debt
is stymied by the persistence of differential credit and liquidity risk premiums among participating countries as well
as by variations in legal traditions, procedures, issuance calendars and primary dealer systems. Market segmentation
has  also  been  prolonged  by  intense  competition  among  governments  to  establish  their  own  issues  as  EMU
benchmarks.
On balance, therefore, it seems unlikely that anticipated efficiency gains, though substantial, will  soon suffice on
their own to displace the greenback from top rank. To date, there is little evidence of reduced transaction costs for
Europe’s new money. Indeed, for some types of transactions, bid-ask spreads have actually increased relative to the
corresponding spreads for the DM, Europe’s most widely traded currency prior to EMU (Hau et al. 2002a, 2002b). In
reality, no one expects that euro transactions costs will ever decline to a level substantially below those presently
quoted for the dollar.
Anti-growth bias. A second critical factor is a serious anti-growth bias that appears to be built into the institutional
structure of EMU. By impacting negatively on yields on euro-denominated assets, this structural bias directly affects
the  new currency’s attractiveness as an  investment  medium. When  EMU first  came into existence, eliminating
exchange risk  within  the European region, a massive shift  was predicted in  the allocation  of  global  savings as
compared with holdings of European assets in the past. In fact, however, international portfolio managers have been
slow  to  move  into  the  euro  (Detken  and  Hartmann  2002),  evidently  because  of  doubts  about  prospects  for
longer-term growth. In turn, the main cause for such doubts seems to lie in the core institutional provisions of EMU
governing monetary and fiscal policy, the key determinants of macroeconomic performance. In neither policy domain
is priority attached to promoting real production. Rather, in each, the main emphasis is on other considerations that
can be expected to limit opportunities for future expansion –imparting a distinct anti-growth bias to the economy of
Euroland as a whole.
On the monetary policy side, the European Central Bank, unlike many other monetary authorities, was created with
just a single policy mandate –to maintain price stability. Moreover, the ECB is endowed with absolute independence,
insulating it from political influence of any kind. Legally, the ECB is free to focus exclusively on fighting inflation,
even if over time this might be at the cost of stunting real growth. In practice, naturally, the ECB is not wholly
insensitive to growth concerns. Nonetheless, the overall  orientation of ECB priorities is clear. Since EMU’s start,
monetary conditions in Euroland have been among the tightest in the industrial world. The bias of policy has plainly
been towards restraint, not expansion.
Likewise,  on  the  side  of  fiscal  policy,  Euroland  governments  have  formally  tied  their  own  hands  with  their
controversial  Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), which mandates a medium-term objective of fiscal  balance in all
participating economies as well as a strict cap on annual budget deficits. These fiscal restraints make it exceedingly
difficult for elected officials to use budgetary policy for contracyclical  purposes, to offset the anti-growth bias of
monetary policy. Here too, we know, practice has at times diverged from principle; and many specialists in Europe
have called for revision or repeal of the Pact’s principle provisions. Until now, however, such appeals have made
little headway. So long as the SGP remains officially binding on all Euroland governments, an anti-growth bias will
be perpetuated in fiscal policy too.
Governance. Finally, there is the governance structure of EMU, which for the euro’s prospects as an international
currency may be the biggest obstacle of all. The basic question is: who is in charge? The answer, regrettably, has
never  been  clear.  From the  start,  much  confusion  has reigned concerning the  delegation  of  authority  among
governments and EU institutions. The Maastricht Treaty, which brought EMU into existence, embodies a variety of
artful compromises and deliberate obfuscations in provisions for the political management of the euro, resulting in a
high level of ambiguity. Prospective users of the new currency, therefore, may be excused for hesitating to commit
themselves to what seemingly amounts to a pig in a poke –even if in fact transaction costs could be lowered to
competitive levels and rewards to European capital could be significantly improved.
Three key provisions are at issue. First is the governance of EMU’s core institution, the European Central Bank itself.
Immediate operational control of monetary policy lies in the hands of the ECB’s Executive Board, made up of the
President, Vice-President and four other members. Ultimate authority, however, is formally lodged in the Governing
Council, which in addition to the six-member Executive Board includes heads of central banks of the participating
The Geopolitics of Currencies and the Future of the International System http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_eng/Print?W...
5 de 12 14/12/2011 1:53
states –a number  seemingly  greater  than  consistent  with  efficient  collective  decision  making. Sooner  or  later,
therefore, as so often happens in large multinational institutions, real power will have to devolve to a smaller ‘inner’
group formally or informally charged with resolving differences on critical issues. But who will be allowed to join this
exclusive club? Would it be the members of the Executive Board, who might be expected to take a broad approach to
Euroland’s needs and interests? Or would it be a select coterie of central-bank governors, whose views could turn
out to be more parochial? For the moment, no one knows.
Second is the critical matter of exchange-rate policy. Under the Maastricht Treaty, the ECB is assigned day-to-day
responsibility  for  the euro’s external  value. Authority  over  the  more  general  orientation  of  policy,  however, is
uneasily  shared  with  both  the  Council  of  Ministers,  representing  national  governments,  and  the  European
Commission in Brussels. Plainly, power over exchange rates was meant to be shared in some form of consensual
process. But, equally, these provisions could turn out to be a sure recipe for political deadlock and drift. Again, no
one knows.
Finally, there is the issue of external representation. Who is to speak for Euroland on broader macroeconomic issues
such as policy coordination, crisis management or reform of the international financial architecture? Here there is no
answer  at  all,  leaving a  vacuum at  the  heart  of  EMU. No  single  body  is designated to represent  EMU at  the
International Monetary Fund or in other global forums. Instead, the Maastricht Treaty simply lays down a procedure
for resolving the issue at a later date, presumably on a case-by-case basis. This is a cop-out that, at a minimum,
compounds confusion about who is in  charge. At worst, the vacuum condemns Euroland to lasting second-class
status,  since  it  limits  the  group’s  ability  to  project  power  in  international  negotiations.  As one  source  warns
(McNamara and Meunier 2002: 850): ‘As long as no “single voice” has the political authority to speak on behalf of
the euro area, as the US Secretary of the Treasury does for the American currency, the pre-eminence of the US in
international monetary matters, as in other realms, is likely to remain unchallenged’.
III. Government Preferences
But is Europe really likely to accept such an unfavourable geopolitical  outcome? Is Japan? Whatever the logic of
market competition, the Europeans and Japanese can hardly be expected to leave market actors entirely to their
own devices –particularly if that means passively submitting to the continued dominance of the dollar. Currency
rivalries, in practice, reflect the influence of government preferences as well as market forces. However, once we
introduce government preferences, the outlook for the geopolitics of currencies becomes considerably more cloudy.
A critical distinction
One thing is certain. A strategy to maintain or enhance market position will be the preferred choice of both Europe
and Japan. Rational policymakers are unlikely to turn their back on the considerable benefits that may be derived
from broader circulation of their currency. But following a suggestion I have made elsewhere (Cohen 2003a), a
critical distinction must be drawn between two different kinds of geopolitical monetary conflict: informal and formal.
Given the stakes involved, there seems little doubt that both Europe and Japan will all do what they can to sustain
the underlying competitiveness of their currencies, with the objective of defending or promoting widespread use by
market actors. Rivalry for market share –what I call informal conflict– is natural in an oligopoly. It is less evident,
however, whether either will be motivated to go a step further, to seek to influence the behaviour of state actors
–that is, to sponsor formation of an organized currency bloc, what I call formal conflict. Will Europe or Japan seek to
offer direct inducements to foreign governments to encourage greater reliance on their money? About this prospect
there is more uncertainty, not least because the balance of benefits and costs implied by that extra step is not at all
clear.
What is clear is that whatever either one does is sure to be closely watched by Washington. Any move to promote
organized currency blocs would transform the low politics of market competition, by definition, into the high politics
of  diplomatic  confrontation.  The  risk  is  that  policy  manoeuvring  could  lead  to  increased geopolitical  tensions,
particularly if monetary initiatives were perceived to be encroaching on established regional relationships. Precisely
for that reason, however, it is more likely that both Japan and Europe, ultimately, will act with restraint to avoid
direct confrontations with the United States that could jeopardize more vital  political  and security interests. The
safest  bet  is  that  currency  rivalries  among  the  Big  Three  will  be  restricted  mainly  to  the  realm of  market
transactions.  The  one exception  could be  in  the  Middle  East,  where  rivalry  for  the  monetary  favour  of  OPEC
governments could conceivably generate a serious battle between Europe and Washington.
Informal conflict
In the oligopolistic setting created by deterritorialization, both Europe and Japan have obvious incentives to promote
the competitiveness of their respective currencies –to ‘sell’ their  brand of money to as many potential  users as
possible.  On  the  European  side,  the  successful  launch  of  EMU  has created  a  golden  opportunity  to  move  up
significantly in the Currency Pyramid. Conversely, on the Japanese side, recent setbacks have increased pressure to
take defensive measures to prevent any further slide down in global ranking. The obvious target for both is the
dollar, the incumbent Top Currency. Rivalry at the market level, therefore, is apt to be intense.
Japan, for example, has given every indication that it intends to stay in the race, competing actively to preserve as
much as possible of the yen’s shrinking international role. Indeed, reversal of the currency’s slide in standing was
made an official policy objective in 1998 and was given further impetus the next year by a widely publicized report
of a Ministry of Finance advisory group, the Council on Foreign Exchange and Other Transactions (1999). Declared
the Council (1999:1-2): ‘Internationalization has not necessarily kept pace with what is warranted by the scale of
the Japanese economy... Recent economic and financial  environments affecting Japan point to the need for  the
greater internationalization of the yen... The question of what Japan must do to heighten the international role of
The Geopolitics of Currencies and the Future of the International System http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_eng/Print?W...
6 de 12 14/12/2011 1:53
the yen has re-emerged as a vital issue’.
Most emphasis in Japan has been placed on continued implementation of the Big Bang reform process, which it is
hoped will eventually succeed in lowering yen transaction costs to levels more like those for the dollar or euro. Along
the same lines, the government has also floated a plan to drop two zeros from the yen, currently valued at over one
hundred yen for  either  the dollar  or  the  euro. Establishing a rough parity  with  the US and European monies,
Japanese authorities think, might also facilitate wider use of their currency. Simplifying the yen’s denomination, said
one official when the plan first came to light, ‘would be good for internationalizing and regaining trust in the yen’
(6).  Commented a foreign banker in Tokyo: ‘If there’s a liquid market in dollars and a liquid market in euros, there’s
a risk of Japan becoming a sort of second-string market... They don’t want the yen to become the Swiss franc of
Asia’ (7).  It is evident that Tokyo will not allow further erosion of its currency’s market standing without a fight.
On  the  European  side,  official  aspirations  remain  more  modest.  According to  authoritative  statements  by  the
European Central Bank, the development of the euro as an international currency –to the extent it happens– will
mainly be a market-driven process, simply one of many possible by-products of EMU. Europe, says the ECB (2002:
11), ‘does not pursue the internationalisation of the euro as an independent policy goal... It neither fosters nor
hinders this process’. These carefully considered words, however, may be dismissed as little more than diplomatic
rhetoric, revealing nothing. Behind the scenes it is known that there is considerable disagreement within European
elites, with the eventual direction of policy still unsettled. Many in Europe are indeed inclined to leave the future of
the euro purely to the logic of market competition. But many others, resentful of the dollar’s strong incumbency
advantages,  favour  a  more  proactive  stance  to  reinforce  EMU’s  potential.  Few Europeans are  unaware  of  the
advantages that the United States derives from the greenback’s perch atop the Currency Pyramid –what Charles De
Gaulle  famously denounced as America’s ‘exorbitant  privilege’. The euro has long been  viewed in  some circles,
particularly in France, as the EU’s best chance to challenge US pre-eminence in monetary affairs. Charles Wyplosz
(1999: 76) calls this ‘the hidden agenda of Europe’s long-planned adoption of a single currency’.
Much more revealing, therefore, is not what the ECB says but what it does. Especially suggestive is the bank’s
controversial decision to issue euro notes in denominations as high as 100, 200, and 500 euros –sums far greater
than most Eurolanders are likely to find useful for everyday transactions. Why issue such large notes? Informed
sources suggest that the plan may have been decided in order to reassure the German public, fearful of losing their
beloved deutsche mark, that notes comparable to existing high-denomination DM bills would be readily available.
But that is hardly the whole story. As knowledgeable experts such as Wyplosz (1999) and Kenneth Rogoff (1998)
have observed, it is also likely that the decision had something to do with the familiar phenomenon of currency
substitution:  the  already  widespread circulation  of  large-denomination  dollar  notes,  especially  US$100  bills,  in
various parts of the world. In Rogoff’s words (1998: 264): ‘Given the apparently overwhelming preference of foreign
and  underground  users  for  large-denomination  bills,  the  [ECB’s]  decision  to  issue  large  notes  constitutes  an
aggressive step toward grabbing a large share of developing country demand for safe foreign currencies’. Europeans
who favour more widespread use of the euro have openly applauded the plan. Writes one (Hüfner 2000: 25): ‘The
United States is able to obtain goods and services by simply giving foreigners pieces of green paper that cost pennies
to print.... There is no reason why the United States should monopolize these benefits’.
What more could Europe do, apart from issuing high-denomination notes? The answer lies in the three reasons for
the euro’s sluggish ascent to date. More could be done to lower transaction costs for non-residents in European
financial  markets.  International  investments  in  euro  bonds and stocks might  be  encouraged with  selected tax
incentives, including abolition of any withholding or reporting requirements. Similarly, broader cross-border use of
the euro as a vehicle currency could be underwritten with targeted subsidies for European banks, lowering the cost
of commercial  credit  for  third-country trade. More could also be done to reverse the anti-growth bias built into
Euroland’s institutional structure and to clarify the governance structure of EMU. As indicated, much room exists for
policy actions to make the euro more appealing to market actors.
How will Washington react to such competition? Officially, the United States remains unconcerned. Policy statements
regarding prospective challenges from the yen or euro have been studiously neutral, avoiding provocation. But such
words too may be dismissed as diplomatic rhetoric, concealing as much as they reveal. As Richard Portes (1999: 34)
observes: ‘It is difficult to believe that the American authorities are indifferent’. In fact, in Washington too there is
considerable disagreement  behind the scenes about  what  should be the eventual  direction of  policy. But  much
sentiment exists to respond in kind to any direct threat to the dollar. Introduction of the ECB’s large-denomination
bills, for example, quickly generated counterproposals to issue a rival US$500 Federal Reserve note, designed to
preserve  America’s seigniorage earnings abroad. Japan’s efforts to  revive  the  yen  are no less likely  to  arouse
opposition and even irritation in Washington. As even a yen enthusiast like David Hale acknowledges (1995: 162),
there is ‘a risk that [Japanese initiatives] will be interpreted as a threat by some Americans [and] could intensify the
economic conflicts that are already straining US-Japan relations’. The probability is that aggressive policy measures
from either Japan or Europe will ultimately provoke countermeasures from Washington, with all of the Big Three
doing what they can to maximize market use.
IV. Formal Conflict
This does not mean, however, that either Japan or Europe must necessarily go the next step, to seek to influence
state behaviour. Compared with the benefits of market leadership, the additional gains from sponsoring a formal
currency bloc could be considerable. But so too could be the costs, political as well as economic, discouraging new
initiatives. Prediction, therefore, is chancy. The safest bet is that both Japan and Europe, ultimately, will  act with
restraint to avoid direct geopolitical confrontation with the United States. A key exception, however, could be in the
Middle East, where serious friction between Europe and Washington is a distinct possibility.
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Japan
From the Japanese side, a formal challenge of some kind must be anticipated. The reason is simple. If Tokyo does
nothing the yen’s slide in standing could become irreversible, even in East Asia, a region that the Japanese prefer to
think of as their  own backyard. It  is difficult to imagine that Tokyo will  accept such a loss of status without a
struggle. But  it  is also difficult  to imagine that  any  Japanese challenge would be  carried to the  point  of  open
confrontation  with  the United States,  which  has its own established relationships in  East  Asia. There are good
reasons to  believe  that  tensions between  the  two governments  on  currency  matters,  though  almost  certainly
unavoidable, will not be unmanageable.
Japanese officials have made no secret of  the fact that their  aspirations now extend well  beyond mere market
competitiveness. The best defence for a beleaguered yen, they seem to have decided, is a strong offence. Beyond
‘selling’ its brand of money to market users, the Japanese seem intent on ‘selling’ it to neighbouring governments,
too –in short, to do what they can to build a formal East Asian currency bloc– even though this would unavoidably
come at the expense of America’s dollar. Tokyo hopes to persuade neighbours to anchor their exchange rates to the
yen and to make the yen their principal reserve currency, displacing the greenback. Efforts along these lines have
persisted despite the risk of provoking Washington.
Symptomatic was Japan’s response to the great Asian financial  crisis that began in mid-1997. Tokyo seized the
occasion to propose a new US$100 billion regional financial facility, quickly dubbed the Asian Monetary Fund (AMF).
Ostensibly, the aim of the AMF was to help protect local currencies against speculative attack. In practice, an ‘Asia-
for-Asians’ fund excluding the United States would have gone far to institutionalize Japanese dominance in regional
currency affairs, undermining American interests. Though the Japanese denied any ulterior motives, the prospect
frankly dismayed US officials, and the proposal was quickly suppressed.
Nonetheless, despite economic troubles at home and the steady repatriation of private investments from abroad,
Tokyo has persisted in seeking new ways to promote its regional currency role. In October 1998, the then Finance
Minister Kiichi Miyazawa offered some US$30 billion in fresh financial aid for Asia in a plan soon labelled the New
Miyazawa Initiative; and more recently, in May 2000, agreement was reached on a planned new network of swap
arrangements with Asian nations, named the Chiang Mai Initiative after the town in Thailand where negotiations
took place. Because both initiatives were confined to the so-called ‘ASEAN+3’ (the ten nations of the Association of
South-east Asian Nations plus China, Japan, and Korea), with no explicit part for the United States, many see them
as a further affirmation of Tokyo’s continued interest in the creation of an exclusive yen bloc– subtle attempts to
achieve  the  aims  of  the  AMF  by  incremental  means  while  avoiding  the  politically  more  provocative  step  of
establishing a  formal  institution.  As such  initiatives multiply,  tensions with  Washington  seem set  to  continue,
perhaps even to grow.
Tension, however, is not the same as conflict. Tokyo may aspire to assume more of the role of a great monetary
power, but almost certainly not at the expense of the broader political  and security relationship that it has long
enjoyed with the United States. ‘The bilateral relationship with the United States’, writes one expert (Green 2001:
3-4), ‘is the indispensable core of Japan’s position in the world... On issues of fundamental interest to the United
States, Japan remains deferential and cautious’. In fact, a delicate balancing act is involved, as students of Japanese
foreign policy have long understood (Vogel 2002). The delicacy of the balance is well illustrated by the Chiang Mai
Initiative,  which  is directly  premised on  involvement  of  the  International  Monetary  Fund –and thus indirectly
assumes a part for the United States, the IMF’s most influential member– as a condition for assistance.
Nor can Japan ignore the threat of an emergent China looming on the horizon, which increases even more the value
of preserving a special  relationship with  Washington. China has already gained a good deal  of  diplomatic clout
throughout East Asia as a result of its rapid economic expansion in recent years and shows every sign of intending to
challenge Japanese aspirations for regional leadership. Resistance to the Chinese juggernaut would be especially
difficult without backing from the Americans.
Tokyo, in  short,  has no interest  in  alienating its most  powerful  ally.  Nor  is Washington  eager  to jeopardize  a
decades-old relationship that is still valued highly for the stability it helps bring to a troubled part of the world. Both
sides can be expected to continue to manoeuvre for advantage in Asian finance. But neither is likely to let their
monetary rivalry get out of control.
Europe
A formal  challenge from Europe is also possible –but,  outside  the  Middle East,  improbable. The  Europeans, as
indicated, will no doubt make every effort to promote use of their new money at the market level wherever they
can. It is also evident that they will not discourage greater reliance on the euro by nearby governments, particularly
in East-Central Europe and the Balkans. But none of this will trigger geopolitical conflict with Washington unless the
EU’s aspirations begin to spread beyond its immediate neighbourhood to regions more traditionally aligned with the
United States. Arguably, only in the Middle East is there a significant risk of direct confrontation.
That is not to say that there are no Europeans with more global ambitions for the euro. Quite the contrary. Portes
and Rey (1998), for example, plainly favour what they call the ‘big euro’ scenario, where the euro would join the
dollar  at  the  peak  of  the  Currency  Pyramid.  The  dollar,  they  declare  (1998:  308),  ‘will  have  to  share  the
number-one position’. But this is a minority view. Most informed opinion in Europe accepts that there are limits to
what might be regarded as the natural home for a formal euro zone.
An EMU bloc would naturally include most if not all of the countries of Europe itself, including first and foremost the
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ten applicant states due to join the EU in 2004. Beyond EMU’s present dozen members, six regional jurisdictions
have already adopted the euro as their exclusive legal tender, including the tiny enclaves of Andorra, Monaco, San
Marino and the Vatican, as well as Montenegro and Kosovo, two special cases in the Balkans. In addition, several
regional economies are pegged to the euro via currency boards, including Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Estonia
and Lithuania; and most other nearby currencies are more loosely linked. Some maintain basket pegs that give
greatest weight to the euro; others have adopted systems of managed floating with the euro unofficially used as an
anchor.  Momentum toward full  ‘euroization’ will  only  grow as EU  enlargement  proceeds.  As Pier  Carlo  Padoan
suggests (2000: 101): ‘The case is easily stated. What matters is not “if” but “when”’. Every regional government
aspiring to join the EU club expects to adopt the euro, too.
Indeed, for the EU, the problem is not whether to speed up the euro’s spread to the rest of Europe but rather to slow
it  down.  Though  all  new entrants  must  commit  to  adopting  the  euro  as  a  condition  of  EU  membership,  full
participation in EMU will not occur automatically. Formally, after joining the EU, governments will first be obliged to
meet  a  number  of  demanding  conditions  –the  same  ‘convergence  criteria’  that  were  demanded  of  present
participants before  they  could become full  partners in  EMU.  Aspirants  must  also  participate  successfully  for  a
minimum of two years in the pegging arrangement to the euro known as the Exchange Rate Mechanism. Several of
the candidate countries, however, have spoken openly of the possibility of adopting the euro unilaterally, without
waiting first to meet the Maastricht conditions. Why postpone the advantages of access to one of world’s leading
currencies?
EU authorities, however, have been doing all they can to forestall a rush to the euro, mainly on the grounds that
participation without adequate preparation could prove unmanageable, straitjacketing governments at just the time
when flexibility  will  be most needed. Strains could arise because of changing economic structures and shifts in
monetary demand, as well as sizable and possibly volatile capital flows and differential growth trends in productivity.
A gradual  approach has been forcefully advocated by both the Council  of Ministers and European Parliament. In
November 2001, EU heads of government formally insisted that candidate countries should follow the prescribed
path. In public, the European Central Bank is more equivocal, suggesting that candidates could adopt the euro if
they wish so long as they understand that the ECB would not be obliged to take them into account when making
policy. In private, monetary officials are more adamant, worrying about the impact that unilateral  ‘euroizations’
might have on their control  of the supply of euros in circulation. The last thing they want at this stage is to be
burdened with responsibility for underwriting still underdeveloped and fragile banking systems.
Whatever  the rate of momentum, though, Washington is unlikely to take offence. The United States has never
questioned the EU’s privileged interests in what is universally acknowledged to be its own backyard. Indeed, for
geopolitical  reasons Washington might even be inclined to prod the Europeans along. More positive support for
inclusion  of  candidate  countries promises to  bring greater  stability  to  a  potentially  volatile  region. As Randall
Henning has observed (2000: 18): ‘The consolidation of the monetary union contributes to economic and political
stability in Central  and Eastern Europe... If the monetary union were to fail, Central  and Eastern Europe would
probably be considerably less stable... As a consequence, US manpower and resource commitments would have to be
correspondingly greater. This geopolitical consideration is profoundly important for US foreign policy’.
Nor is Washington likely to take offence if the growing EMU bloc were extended to encompass as well countries of
the Mediterranean littoral and sub-Saharan Africa that have close economic and political linkages with the EU. These
too are regarded as Euro-time zone states. Some of their currencies are already pegged to the euro, including most
prominently the CFA Franc in central and west Africa, for which Europe’s new money has seamlessly taken over the
anchor role previously played by the French franc; and for most the euro is already an important reserve currency.
Here too Washington might even prod the Europeans along in the interest of regional stabilization.
The critical question is: might Europe aspire to go further? There is no evidence that the EU would seriously consider
challenging the dollar in Latin America or Asia, where it is Washington’s interests that are clearly seen as privileged.
These areas, Europeans acknowledge, are America’s turf. But what about the Middle East, with its concentration of
wealthy oil exporters? If the geopolitics of currencies is to lead to direct confrontation anywhere, it will be here.
The Middle East
Three  factors  explain  why  the  Middle  East  could become a  currency  battleground.  First  is  the  sheer  scale  of
monetary  riches in  the  area  controlled directly  or  indirectly  by  national  governments.  Exports of  oil  generate
massive revenues for state authorities in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and other countries scattered around the Persian
Gulf; and much of this wealth, in turn, is either stored away in central bank reserves or invested abroad in publicly
held portfolios. What these governments decide to do with their money can have a major impact on the relative
fortunes of international currencies.
Second is the instability of great-power alignments in the area. Within the Euro-time zone, the United States may
happily defer to Europe; conversely, across Latin America and Asia, Europe may still accept Washington’s strategic
dominance. But in geopolitical terms the Middle East is a contested region, as the still unfinished business of Iraq
clearly testifies. For the moment, most governments in the region find it prudent to accept US leadership and even
US troops. But with their ample economic and cultural ties to the area, Europe’s governments remain committed to
playing an important regional role. Resentment of Washington’s displacement of Europe’s historical pre-eminence in
the area is rife among Europeans.
And third is the seeming contradiction between the region’s commercial ties with the outside world and its financial
relations. Foreign trade is dominated by Europe, which is by far the biggest market for the Middle East’s oil exports
as well  as the largest source of its imports. Yet financial  relations are dominated by the United States and the
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almighty greenback. America’s dollar is not only the standard for invoicing and payments in world energy markets. It
also accounts for the vast majority of central bank reserves and government-held investments in the region and is
the anchor, de jure or de facto, for most local currencies. In the eyes of many the disjunction seems anomalous,
even irrational. Repeatedly, the question is asked: would it not make more sense to do business with the area’s
biggest trading partner, Europe, in Europe’s own currency rather than the greenback? And if so, would it not then
make sense to switch to the euro as a reserve currency and monetary anchor as well?
Together, these three factors add up to an obvious recipe for geopolitical conflict, should Europe choose to turn up
the  heat.  Certainly,  the  possibility  of  a  switch  to  the  euro  is  tempting from a  European  perspective.  Almost
immediately, given the large sums involved, the EU’s new currency would be vaulted to the ‘big euro’ scenario
favoured by Portes and Rey (1998) and others, while restoring a measure of Europe’s historically privileged position
in the Middle East. Arguably, the prospect might be tempting from the perspective of local governments too, for
sound financial reasons as well as to curb America’s presently overweening influence. It is well known that from time
to time oil exporting states have actively explored alternatives to the dollar, only to be discouraged by the lack of a
suitable substitute. Now, with the arrival of the euro, they see the possibility of a truly competitive rival for their
affections. In the artfully composed words of a high official of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC): ‘It is worthwhile to note that in the long run the euro is not at such a disadvantage versus the dollar... I
believe that OPEC will not discount entirely the possibility of adopting euro pricing and payments in the future’ (8).
Indeed, some straws are already in the wind. As early as October 2000, in a deliberate snub to the United States,
Iraq’s now deposed dictator Saddam Hussein began demanding payment in euros for his country’s oil exports. He
also converted his US$10 billion United Nations reserve fund into euros, making a considerable profit once Europe’s
currency began to appreciate two years later. And, more recently, Iran  is known to have considered a similar
strategy. Should Europe seek directly  to ‘sell’  its brand of  money to regional  governments,  it  might  find itself
pushing against an open door.
Any effort along these lines, however, would surely provoke determined opposition from the United States, which
clearly prefers to keep the region’s door as firmly shut to the euro as possible. For Washington today, there is no
higher  politics than the Great Game being played out in  the Middle East. With so much at stake, the level  of
tolerance for a formal currency challenge from Europe would be correspondingly low, making geopolitical conflict a
virtual certainty. For some observers, the conflict has already begun with America’s attack on Iraq, which is said to
have been motivated above all by the euro’s threat to the dollar. In the words of one widely circulated commentary
(Clark 2003: 1): ‘It is an oil currency war. The Real Reason for [the war] is this administration’s goal of preventing
further  OPEC  momentum towards  the  euro  as  an  oil  transaction  currency  standard’.  Such  a  theory,  wholly
unsubstantiated by plausible evidence, obviously smacks of conspiratorial thinking (9).  But one does not have to be
a sensationalist to recognize the seeds of truth it contains. A battle of currencies in the Middle East could become
serious.
Would Europe risk it? In the end, however strongly tempted, Europeans are more likely to keep their aspirations in
check, in order to avert direct confrontation with Washington. Like the Japanese, most Europeans have no wish to
jeopardize the broader political and security relationship that they have long enjoyed with the United States. Hence
like the Japanese, they too can be expected to act with restraint beyond their currency’s natural home. In the Middle
East, as in East Asia, manoeuvring for advantage will persist, but monetary rivalry, most likely, will not be allowed
to get out control.
V. Conclusion
Overall, therefore, the outlook for the geopolitics of currencies appears relatively benign. In the global marketplace,
competition  between  the  dollar  and its  two  main  rivals,  the  euro  and yen,  will  continue  to  be  intense,  and
governments will do all they can to sustain the competitive appeal of their currencies. But at the level of inter-state
relations, the low politics of market competition is unlikely to be transformed into the high politics of diplomatic
confrontation,  largely  because  neither  Japan  nor  Europe will  be eager  to seriously  provoke the  United States.
Miscalculations are always possible, of course, despite the best of intentions. Japan could overstep its efforts to
sustain the role of the yen in Asia; Europe, likewise, might well go too far in promoting use of the euro in the Middle
East. The safest bet, however, is for mutual restraint by all of the Big Three at the top of the Currency Pyramid,
keeping great-power rivalries in check.
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NOTES
[1]. Because each foreign-exchange transaction involves two currencies, the total of shares adds up to 200% rather than 100%.
[2]. Porter and Judson 1996; US Treasury 2000; Judson and Porter 2001. But see also Feige 1996 and 1997, who suggests a lower
figure of about 40%.
[3]. The estimate, based on Seitz 1995, may be conservative. According to Doyle 2000, a more accurate figure for the mid-1990s could
have been as high as 69%. See also Feige and Dean 2002. On the other hand, there is evidence to suggest that after 1999, when
Europe’s monetary union first got under way, foreign holdings of German currency declined somewhat owing to uncertainties about the
conversion of DM notes into euro notes that was scheduled for January 2002. See Sinn and Westermann 2001a, 2001b; Stix 2001.
[4]. Hale 1995. Rogoff 1998, inferring from indirect evidence, suggests a higher figure of 25%. Publicly, the Bank of Japan is unwilling to
offer any kind of official estimate. See, eg, Bank of Japan 1994.
[5]. The yen’s retreat since the start of the 1990s is well documented by Katada 2002.
[6]. As quoted in The Economist, 30 October 1999, p. 85.
[7]. As quoted in the New York Times, 19 November 1999, C4.
[8]. Yarjani 2002. Yarjani is head of OPEC’s Petroleum Market Analysis Department.
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